FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Admiralty and maritime rules of practice (which included libel procedures) were superseded, and civil and admiralty procedures in United States district courts were unified, effective July 1, 1966, see rule 1 and Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, Appendix to this title.

Sec. 2461. Mode of recovery (a) Whenever a civil fine, penalty or pecuniary forfeiture is prescribed for the violation of an Act of Congress without specifying the mode of recovery or enforcement thereof, it may be recovered in a civil action. (b) Unless otherwise provided by Act of Congress, whenever a forfeiture of property is prescribed as a penalty for violation of an Act of Congress and the seizure takes place on the high seas or on navigable waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, such forfeiture may be enforced by libel in admiralty but in cases of seizures on land the forfeiture may be enforced by a proceeding by libel which shall conform as near as may be to proceedings in admiralty.

Sec. 2462. Time for commencing proceedings Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the property is found within the United States in order that proper service may be made thereon.

Sec. 2463. Property taken under revenue law not repleviable All property taken or detained under any revenue law of the United States shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the custody of the law and subject only to the orders and decrees of the courts of the United States having jurisdiction thereof. SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS This section is referred to in title 26 section 7434.

Sec. 2464. Security; special bond (a) Except in cases of seizures for forfeiture under any law of the United States, whenever a warrant of arrest or other process in rem is issued in any admiralty case, the United States marshal shall stay the execution of such process, or discharge the property arrested if the process has been levied, on receiving from the respondent or claimant of the property a bond or stipulation in double the amount claimed by the libellant, with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge of the district court where the case is pending, or, in his absence, by the collector of the port, conditioned to answer the decree of the court in such case. Such bond or stipulation shall be returned to the court, and judgment or decree thereon, against both the principal and sureties, may be secured at the time of rendering the decree in the original case. The owner of any vessel may deliver to the marshal a bond or stipulation, with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge of the district court, conditioned to answer the decree of such court in all or any cases that are brought thereafter in such court against the vessel. Thereupon the execution of all such process against such vessel shall be stayed so long as the amount secured by such bond or stipulation is at least double the aggregate amount claimed by libellants in such suits which are begun and pending against such vessel. Similar judgments or decrees and remedies may be had on such bond or stipulation as if a special bond or stipulation had been filed in each of such suits. (b) The court may make necessary orders to carry this section into effect, particularly in giving proper notice of any such suit. Such bond or stipulation shall be endorsed by the clerk with a minute of the suits wherein process is so stayed. Further security may be required by the court at any time. (c) If a special bond or stipulation in the particular case is given under this section, the liability as to said case on the general bond or stipulation shall cease. The parties may stipulate the amount of the bond or stipulation for the release of a vessel or other property to be not more than the amount claimed in the libel, with interest, plus an allowance for libellant's costs. In the event of the inability or refusal of the parties to so stipulate, the court shall fix the amount, but if not so fixed then a bond shall be required in the amount prescribed in this section. Security; special bond

Sec. 2465. Return of property to claimant; certificate of reasonable cause; liability for wrongful seizure

Upon the entry of judgment for the claimant in any proceeding to condemn or forfeit property seized under any Act of Congress, such property shall be returned forthwith to the claimant or his agent; but if it appears that there was reasonable cause for the seizure, the court shall cause a proper certificate thereof to be entered and the claimant shall not, in such case, be entitled to costs, nor shall the person who made the seizure, nor the prosecutor, be liable to suit or judgment on account of such suit or prosecution.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in title 26 section 7328.

I now proceed to IRS cases to prove the above and what Whiting stated about revenue and admiralty being the same jurisdiction for collection and seizure. He did say that under the war powers "in rem" proceedings are used. His reasoning was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1863.

United States v. One 1966 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 56 F.R.D. 450 (1972); "A proceeding in rem is governed by the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, a supplement to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. (hereinafter Supplemental Rules), See Rule A, Supplemental Rules;"

And this next case, United States of America, Libelant v $3976.62 In Currency, One 1960 Ford Station Wagon, 37 F.R.D. 564; Key 31. "Although presumably for purpose of obtaining jurisdiction, action for forfeiture under Internal Revenue Laws is commenced as proceeding in admiralty, after jurisdiction is obtained proceeding takes on the character of civil action at law, and at least at such stage of proceedings, Rules of Civil Procedure control." "On August 14, 1964 a `libel' of information' (see Supreme Court Admiralty Rule 21; 28 U.S.C.  1355; 26 U.S.C. 7323) was filed by the United States Attorney." Ibid 565.

Further proof is gleaned from Benedict on Admiralty 7th Edition. Quoting from Benedict on Admiralty, 1850; "Its necessary effect [the Act] was, however, to start the courts on that system of practice, and really to impose upon them, in admiralty and maritime cases, the civil law practice, as that under which they must continue to administer justice, even after the expiration of that act, until further provision could be made."

Section 105 states; "The Purpose of the Constitutional Grant -- The Essential Harmony of the Maritime Law. The grand purpose of the Constitution was to unify the several States [several meaning separate], the whole people, in their national, international, and interstate relations and all other purposes were subordinate and ancillary to this."

Section 123 states; "The commission to the Governor as Vice-Admiral was very full, granting, in language so clear that it cannot be misunderstood, an admiralty jurisdiction as wide and beneficial as the most zealous supporters of the English Admiralty ever claimed for it."

This is the type of court that exists today and why we cannot bring a pure Article of the Bill of Rights argument in a contract court of the law-merchant in their civil law under war powers act of 1862. Benedict states at Section 5 that, " "* * *the civil law was held to be the law of admiralty, and the course of proceedings in admiralty, closely resembled the civil law practice."

Remember in 28 USC 2461 it states as near as may be to admiralty?

Revenue comes under commerce and is basic to the jurisdiction of the admiralty/maritime court. Evidence the fact every judge states you can't bring the constitution in his court. You can't bring in the Seventh Article of the Bill of Rights. Why? Because it is evident after reading Benedict on The American Admiralty Its Jurisdiction and Practice, 1850, Chapter XIII section 195, to wit: "So the seventh amendment is limited to suits at common law, which does not include either suits of equity, or of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction". The American people are not under common law or any other law but Emergency War Powers.

American Ins. Co. v Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 545 (1828). "A case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or Laws of the United States."

Most people would not understand why such a case would not come under the constitution. The reason being when in war, and proceeding in admiralty, International law and treaty law takes over. It is stated in Chapter two of Whiting's Book that the Law of Nations, which is International law, rules over the Constitutions. One of the International laws is that of Treaty with the United Nations. So try as you might to oust the United States from the UN treaty, as long as we are the enemy and the United States the belligerent power running the show you will never, under international law that we live under, obtain your goals.

Benedict states at section 204; "In such cases, the question before the court, is not whether the court has jurisdiction, but whether the party have right; it is not a question in abatement, but a question of the merits of the action. `If the cause is a maritime cause, subject to admiralty cognizance, jurisdiction is complete over the person as well as over the ship. It must in its nature be complete, for it cannot be confined to one of the remedies on the contract, when the contract itself is within its cognizance'." The quote he used is from 12 Wheat 460; 7 Howard 729 Boyd's proceedings.

Whether the party have the right? Yes. As enemies of the State, you have no rights that you call unalienable. And the case for that is called, The Sally, 8 Cranch 382, 384, wherein the court stated; "By the general law of prize, property engaged in the illegal intercourse with the enemy is deemed enemy property. It is of no consequence whether it belong to an ally or a citizen; the traffic stamps it with a hostile character, and attaches to it all the penal consequences of enemy ownership". In The Shark, (1862)page 218 the court states, "All persons doing business with the enemy, whether citizens of the United States or citizens of the other belligerent nation or neutrals, are as to their property to be deemed enemies."

Therefore, with all this knowledge as to why you are deemed the enemy, this case called The Julia, (1813) falls right into what Whiting stated in 1864 about the enemy having no rights.

"No contract is considered valid as between enemies, at least so far as to give them a remedy in the courts of either government, and they have, in the language of the civil law, no ability to sustain a persona standi in judicio."

Now you know why people charged under the revenue laws that are in court have a 99 percent chance of losing; have no right to present the law or regulations to the jury, as that has been eliminated slowly since 1867, to claim and show a defense; are 99 percent of the time denied all motions that would have to be ruled in their favor and when having a claim against the United States they always institute a Rule 12 (b) (6) that claims they have not stated a cause in which relief can be granted. This is so because the enemy in rebellion, the cash cow of the United States, the so called "tax protester," can never overcome. The IRS can seize property of all types without any due process in the courts before they take the property as explained in Whiting's Book below.]

Some persons have turned their attention to certain passages in the amendments relating, as was supposed, to this subject. Let us examine them:

Article IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated."

This amendment merely declares that the right of being secure against UNREASONABLE seizures or arrests shall not be violated. It does not declare that NO ARRESTS shall be made. Will any one deny that is reasonable to arrest or capture the person of the public enemy? If all arrests, reasonable or unreasonable, were prohibited, public safety would be disregarded in favor of the rights of individuals. Not only may military, but even civil, arrests be made when reasonable. Emphasis the Solicitor's.

[48 Statutes at Large 1, very specifically declared the people of America "public enemies", whether of the banking cartel or otherwise, it was already done by Lincoln. Now to prove "public enemies" have no rights that are protected by the infamous Bill of Rights is this passage in the Book.]

OBJECTION THAT ARRESTS ARE MADE WITHOUT INDICTMENT

The Fifth article of the amendments to the constitution provides that -- [I let the reader obtain a copy as it is stated here] This article has no reference to the rights of citizens under the exigencies of war, but relates only to their rights in time of peace.

OFFICERS MAKING ARRESTS NOT LIABLE TO CIVIL SUIT OR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

That military arrests are deemed necessary for public [definition for "public" means government only] safety by Congress is shown by the act of March 3, 1863, ch.81, wherein it is provided that no person arrested by authority of the President of the United States shall be discharged from imprisonment so long as the war lasts, and the President shall see fit to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

[Yes, the habeas corpus is a PRIVILEGE and NOT a right, and it is granted by government in time of peace. It can and has, for all intents and purposes, been suspended. This is evident by the fact that between 1957 and about 1990 only 3 percent of all habeas corpus have been granted. Now, all this material so far has proven one thing. That is, the people of America who thought they were sovereign; who thought government was their servant; who thought the constitution was their doing; who thought the Bill of Rights were written for them; who thought the constitution was there to protect them; who thought that white citizens were always above the blacks; who thought the term "citizen" did not show up until after the Fourteenth Amendment; who never realized that blacks voted, held office, held military commissions before the 1787 Constitution; who did not realize that the 1787 Constitution enslaved the black people by considering them property by the institution of Article I, Section 2, Clause 3; who thought the constitution was over all treaty law or International law of nations; who thought we were living in times of peace; who do not believe they are considered "public enemies; who believe that they are free, are sorely mistaken. So let us move along in the Book and destroy some more myths. One has to remember that this Book was written during Civil war and talks about military law, the principles apply to this very day, even though you do not see uniformed officers behind the desks of the alphabet agencies of government, although you do see quasi military presence in the form of a police officer that is termed "law enforcement." They are no longer peace officers.]

MILITARY ARRESTS LAWFUL

The laws of war, military and martial, written and unwritten, founded on the necessities of government, are sanctioned by the Constitution and laws, and recognized as valid by the Supreme Court of the United States. Arrests made under the laws of war are neither arbitrary nor without legal justification. In Cross v Harrison, Judge Wayne, delivering the opinion, (16 Howard, 189, 190,) says:

Early in 1847 the President, as constitutional commander-in-chief of the army and navy, authorized the military and naval commanders of our forces in California to exercise the belligerent rights of a conqueror, and to form a civil government for the conquered country, and to impose duties on imports and tonnage as military contributions for the support of government and of the army which had the conquest in possession. No one can doubt that these orders of the President and the action of our army and navy commanders in California, in conformity with them, were according to the law of arms &c."

So in Fleming v Page, (9 Howard, 615,) Chief Justice Taney says:

"The person who acted in the character of collector in this instance, acted as such under the authority of the military commander and in obedience to his orders; and the regulations he adopted were not those prescribed by law, but by the President in his character as commander-in-chief."

It is established by these opinions that military orders, in accordance with martial law or the laws of war, though they may be contrary to municipal laws; and the use of the usual means of enforcing such orders by military power, including capture, arrest, imprisonment, or the destruction of life and property, [such as those in the Waco incident and others throughout the country] are authorized and sustained upon the firm basis of martial law, which is, in time of war, [and national emergency that we have been living under all our lives]constitutional law.

[Turning to Whiting's separate section Titled, The Return of the Rebellious States to the Union, we see the mindset of government, our enemy, as so aptly stated by Albert J. Nock in his book, Our Enemy, The State. It shows that the people of the south and the north became enemies of the United States, AKA Congress, because the southern states could not be admitted back into the Union and have disabilities different to the north. So Congress overrode President Johnson's veto of the War Powers after Johnson decreed the War Powers over, and then Congress declared that in order to have all states on equal footing they would continue the emergency war powers to include ALL the people in the States of the Union to be enemies, subject to the Confiscation Acts of 12 Stat 319. The section on Reconstruction of the Union shows that the southern States were forced into submitting to the United States, thereby showing, for all to see, that the Constitution is of "No Authority" as stated by eminent Jurist Lysander Spooner.

The south had sought to be free from the Union as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, that whenever government ceased to be what it was supposed to be, they had the right to secede. Such was not the case and shows the fraud of the Constitution for what it is. For if the abuses could not be remedied the South sought to only do what the Constitution stated, and that was to form a new government. They did not want to overthrow the old government. This also proves that the Treaty of 1783 still is supreme over the constitution which the treaty created. This I brought forth in my book The New History of America by quoting from the First Circuit Court of the United States operating in North Carolina in 1796.] fallacy.htm